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SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

Common Country Analysis

Syria 2025[1]

DISCLAIMER: This document represents a collaborative effort between the United Nations system agencies that are supporting Syria's journey toward a resilient, inclusive, and prosperous future. In the first quarter of 2026, this CCA engaged a wide range of stakeholders including the Government of Syria, civil society organizations, international and national NGOs were invited to comment on the CCA's findings.

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Acronyms

CCA – Common Country Analysis

CSOs – Civil Society Organizations

Da'esh – Arabic acronym for ISIL/ISIS

DRR – Disaster Risk Reduction

ESCWA – United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia

ERA – Early Recovery Approach

GBV – Gender-Based Violence

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

G77 – Group of 77 coalition of developing countries

HLP – Housing, Land and Property

IDPs – Internally Displaced Persons

IFIs – International Financial Institutions

IWRM – Integrated Water Resources Management

MHPSS – Mental Health and Psychosocial Support

MOFAE – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates

MSMEs – Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises

NDVI – Normalized Difference Vegetation Index

NGOs – Non-Governmental Organizations

NRP – National Recovery Plan

PFM – Public Financial Management

PPP – Purchasing Power Parity

SDGs – Sustainable Development Goals

SMEs– Small and Medium Enterprises

UNSCDF – UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework

UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UN – United Nations

WASH – Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

WHO – World Health Organization

Executive Summary

In 2026, Syria stands at a pivotal crossroads, marked by 14 years of conflict yet uplifted by progress achieved in 2025, which opens pathways from emergency relief toward nationally led recovery, reconstruction, and sustainable development. The Government of Syria has taken several important steps, bringing the country's future into a different direction. Launching a national dialogue process, organizing indirect elections, advancing Syria's reintegration into the international community, liberalizing the economy, and helping facilitate the easing of sanctions put Syria on a trajectory toward recovery, trust-building, and reconstruction. These initiatives represent meaningful openings for international engagement. In March 2026, the Government of Syria has issued the "Statement of Recovery Priorities for International Cooperation", setting out a nationally owned vision to restore stability, rebuild institutions, and expand opportunities for all Syrians. While the Statement focuses on national recovery, this Common Country Analysis, as a UN analytical document, is undertaken to serve as the cornerstone for Syria's 2030 Agenda for sustainable development while integrating national priorities into the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF).

Recently, the Government of Syria has launched a "No Camps 2026" policy initiative as a national priority, aimed at transitioning displaced populations away from prolonged encampment toward more sustainable, dignified living arrangements. The campaign seeks to reduce long-term dependency on camps by facilitating access to housing, basic services, and livelihood opportunities within host communities and areas of return, while strengthening public financial management and resource allocation to support local absorption capacity. This approach reflects a strategic shift toward durable solutions for displacement, emphasizing fiscal responsibility, social cohesion, and the gradual integration of displaced households into local economies and service systems, in line with national recovery priorities. In 2026, Syria witnessed notable political and security progress in 2025, marked by renewed efforts toward national stabilization and institutional transition. Steps were taken toward the disarmament and integration of armed factions across different regions, including in North-East Syria (NES), where dialogue between the Government of Syria (GoS) and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) contributed to de-escalation, ceasefire understandings, and initial frameworks for security coordination and integration. These measures supported improved stability and facilitated broader state re-engagement in parts of the region.

Notwithstanding the encouraging steps that have been taken, the overall situation remains fragile. Lack of security with widespread lawlessness, incomplete integration of armed factions, and localized violence—including large-scale killings and displacement still exist in many areas across Syria. Also, Israeli military actions inside Syrian territory further deepen instability while terrorism continues to loom. Assessing Syria's SDG targets Syria continues to face significant obstacles in progressing toward the achievement of many Sustainable Development Goals. The Syrian economy continues to operate below its potential amid a devastated industrial base, constrained fiscal and monetary space, limited investment, and a weakened financial system. Living conditions are suffering, with poverty and food insecurity remains widespread and basic services in health, education, water, sanitation and housing require substantial rehabilitation. Communities continue to face widespread contamination from unexploded ordnance, including anti-personnel landmines, cluster munitions, and improvised explosive devices, which pose severe risks to safety and hinder recovery. At the same time, environmental degradation compounded by climate change and extreme weather hazards has intensified pressure on water resources and agricultural systems, threatening food security and livelihoods.

Alongside human and physical losses, prolonged conflict has severely strained institutions, diminishing their capacity, effectiveness, and public trust. As a result, inclusive governance, respect for the rule of law and international human rights, gender equality, plurality, civic space, and transitional justice remain pressing challenges. Human rights violations, such as Housing, Land, and Property (HLP) rights violations, have further eroded security and stability for affected populations. These overlapping challenges disproportionately impact women, children, youth, older persons, persons with disabilities, and displaced communities, who encounter heightened barriers to accessing essential services, housing, livelihoods, and protection.

A core finding of the CCA is that building trust is both a cross-cutting challenge and a key entry point for progress. Building trust requires the delivery of basic services, fair and predictable rules, secure HLP rights, civil

documentation, protection of rights, meaningful participation of women, youth, minorities and other vulnerable groups in decision-making. Looking ahead, the CCA points to several broad directions where nationally-led efforts, supported by the UN and partners, can have catalytic impact through the following transitions: (i) strengthening institutions and local governance to improve service delivery and accountability; (ii) restoring and climate-proofing essential infrastructure and services; (iii) revitalizing agrifood systems and productive sectors, with focus on agricultural and industrial recovery and MSMEs development to generate decent work, especially for youth and women; (iv) advancing durable solutions to displacement, grounded in HLP security and access to basic services and housing; and (v) investing in human capital, including health, education, entrepreneurship and skills development, to enable all Syrians to contribute to recovery. Critical to enabling recovery across all scenarios is large-scale mine action and explosive ordnance risk reduction. Prioritizing demining and clearance of unexploded ordinance is essential to restoring safe access to land, housing, infrastructure, and basic services. Demining will facilitate returning efforts and unlocking agricultural, industrial, and infrastructure investments. Therefore, mine action constitutes a foundational enabler of trust, livelihoods, and durable recovery, requiring national commitments and coordinated international support.

To inform strategic prioritization under uncertainty, this CCA will be complemented by a forward-looking scenario narrative analysis exploring alternative recovery pathways to 2030. These scenarios aim to align international support with national priorities, and by placing hope, trust-building, and the principle of leaving no one behind at the center of action. National and international alignment will support a future with greater stability, dignity, and opportunity for all Syrians.

1. Introduction

This Common Country Analysis (CCA) represents a collaborative effort between the United Nations system agencies that are supporting Syria's journey toward a resilient, inclusive, and prosperous future. In the first quarter of 2026, this CCA development process engaged a wide range of stakeholders through a systematic consultation mechanism. Government counterparts including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and line ministries were invited on 15 February 2026 to discuss the CCA's findings within their respective areas of responsibility to inform the subsequent formulation of the UNSDCF 2027-2030. In March 2026, civil society organizations, international and national NGOs, and academic experts were invited to comment on the CCA's findings.

Building on this CCA's recognition of Syria's multidimensional recovery needs, data and statistical capacity gaps fundamentally constrain evidence-based planning and SDG monitoring. The systematic examination of these gaps reveals critical weaknesses that need to be addressed to support any recovery plan's implementation and track progress toward sustainable development. Syria's national statistical system faces major challenges, with the last national population census conducted in 2004 and the last Household Income and Expenditure Survey conducted in 2009 (CBS Syria). According to ESCWA's latest SDG comprehensive assessment, Syria has country data for only 32 percent in the global database[1], representing one of the lowest coverage rates globally.[5] According to UNFPA, some progress has been seen in gender-disaggregated data collection, with female-headed households representing 33 percent of all households, however, comprehensive age and disability disaggregation remains inconsistent.

Planning and Statistics Authority Syria formerly known as the Central Bureau of Statistics requires substantial technical and institutional support to rebuild core functions, establish modern data collection methodologies, and develop integrated monitoring systems aligned with SDG frameworks. Without addressing these foundational statistical gaps, Syria's recovery planning efforts risk proceeding without adequate evidence bases, potentially undermining the effectiveness of interventions and limiting accountability mechanisms that are essential for rebuilding trust between institutions and communities.

[1] https://www.unescwa.org/portal/arab-sdg-monitor

The CCA analysis provides a UN independent and forward-looking assessment of Syria's current socio-economic, humanitarian and recovery landscape, drawing upon available official data sources, assessments conducted by UN entities, and innovative analytical tools including satellite imagery and geospatial proxies that help fill data gaps where official statistics are not available. Most recent data available reveals that only 57 percent of public hospitals fully functional and 37 percent of primary health care centers operational.[2] Educational institutions face similar challenges, with 40 percent of schools are damaged or destroyed and 2.4 million children out of school[3]. Neighboring countries are hosting the majority of Syrian refugees. Particularly, Türkiye is hosting 3.6 million refugees, Lebanon hosts currently 780,000, and Jordan with 660,000.[4] These refugees represent a crucial knowledge transfer and investment potential for recovery. According to the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, by 2025, 6.4 million internally displaced persons remain inside Syria, while 16.5 million people require humanitarian assistance (with 5.5 million people monthly needing food assistance), and 90 percent are below the poverty line[5]. The education sector exemplifies this challenge, with 2.4 million children out of school, yet detailed breakdowns by age, gender, disability status, and displacement status are often unavailable for targeted interventions. As Syria approaches the end of a prolonged conflict period, this CCA shows that a majority of the population simultaneously requires political stability alongside humanitarian, social, and economic support, placing Syria's recovery at the center of the humanitarian–development–peace nexus.

2. Progress Towards the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs

This section examines Syria's progress toward achieving the SDGs, recognizing both remaining significant challenges and emerging opportunities. The analysis below is organized around four interconnected dimensions: politics and governance, social development, economic transformation, and environmental sustainability. The assessment also discusses the financial landscape and partnership opportunities between the government and the United Nations System. Detailed statistical data and supporting graphs are provided in Annex A.

Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions

By December 2025, Syria faced a severe protection crisis marked by large-scale displacement and weakened governance. The fall of the former government on 8 December 2024 initiated a political transition under President Ahmed al-Sharaa. Guided by a National Dialogue conference in February, a Constitutional Declaration signed on 13 March 2025 established a five-year transition toward a permanent constitution and elections by March 2030. A transitional cabinet was formed on 29 March 2025, and the People's Assembly, formed after indirect elections for 122 seats in October 2025, is expected to hold its first session, once the 70 remaining seats will be filled by presidential appointments. Meanwhile, 18 elected seats from Hasakeh, Raqqa, Aleppo, and Sweida remain vacant. Transitional institutions show limited inclusivity, with women holding only one cabinet position and 5 percent of elected seats and there is a need to ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels.

Significant challenges remain in strengthening governance and state authority. There are ongoing difficulties in promoting inclusiveness, rebuilding trust between communities, and advancing both human rights and gender equality. Additionally, comprehensive reforms in the security sector, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration—are still needed, particularly as they relate to transitional justice and trust building. Efforts to unify armed groups into a national army continue, though key factions some Sweida-based groups remain outside integration and retain de facto territorial control. It is worth mentioning that in 2026, Damascus–SDF ceasefire consolidation and institutional integration in the northeast is resolved. Israeli Defence Forces continue operations

[2] https://humanitarianaction.info/plan/1276/document/syrian-arab-republic-humanitarian-response-priorities-january-december-2025/article/1-humanitarian-needs-1#:~:text=The percent20data percent20was percent20collected percent20after percent208 percent20December,gaps percent2C percent20and percent20strengthen percent20humanitarian percent20interventions percent20across percent20Syria.
[3] https://www.unicef.org/syria/documents/humanitarian-situation-reports-2024
[4] https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria
[5] https://humanitarianaction.info/plan/1518
https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2025-02/undp-sy-seia-final-24022025_compressed.pdf

in Quneitra and parts of Daraa. Criminality, weapons proliferation, and terrorist attacks (including the June 2025 church bombing in Damascus) have further challenged the security and transitional justice landscape, underscoring the importance of Syria's recent accession to the Global Coalition against ISIL/Daesh on 10 November 2025.

The reduction of violence and protection of civilians remains a central concern. The UN has documented extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, and sectarian violence, particularly against Alawite communities in the coast, where over 1,400 were reportedly killed in March 2025, including patterns of conflict-related sexual violence. The UN Commission of Inquiry found reasonable grounds to believe war crimes were committed by extremist-affiliated forces and armed groups with no evidence of a formal government policy, while national authorities pledged reforms and accountability. Intercommunal violence intensified in July, when kidnappings between Bedouin and Druze communities triggered clashes in Sweida and Daraa, resulting in killings, displacement, and widespread rights violations, and witnessing Israeli interference. Syria's media sector is slowly re-emerging but remains constrained by weak legal frameworks, damaged infrastructure, limited resources, and public distrust driven by polarisation. Protecting civic space and countering misinformation and hate speech remains critical. The Security Council reaffirmed its commitment to Syria's sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity in line with the key principles of resolution 2254 (2015), underlining the importance of the UN's role in supporting an inclusive, Syrian-led and Syrian-owned transition.

Rule of Law and Local Governance

Rule of law is central to Syria's recovery, underpinning accountable governance, protection of human rights, equitable access to justice, and institutional trust. However, rule-of-law institutions remain fragmented, under-resourced, and constrained by limited independence, weak oversight, outdated legal frameworks, and significant infrastructure damage, resulting in inconsistent enforcement, perceived impunity, and eroded public confidence. While the Government of Syria has initiated reform efforts, fragmented security governance, limited civilian oversight, and insufficient professionalization continue to undermine the rule of law.

Local governance in Syria lacks adequate institutional capacity, coherence, and human resources because of prolonged conflict. The conflict has led to a large-scale loss of experienced civil servants and technical staff; brain drain and limited training opportunities. Local governance institutions across Syria remain fragmented, with varying degrees of capacity, legitimacy, and resources, limiting their ability to deliver equitable and accountable basic services. Weak fiscal decentralization and constrained local revenue generation undermine local authorities' responsiveness to community needs and recovery priorities. Limited participation of women, youth, and marginalized groups in local decision-making also continues to impede inclusive governance and community ownership of local development processes.

Overall, strengthening national rule of law requires institutional rehabilitation and modernization, legislative and policy reform aligned with international benchmarks and expanded access to justice for vulnerable populations. At the local level, local institutions require enhanced technical and institutional capacity to perform core state functions, ensure transparency, and deliver inclusive services nationally and within local areas. Advancing e-government—at the state and the local level initiatives will be crucial for modernizing public administration and improving the delivery of essential services. Utilizing regional experience, especially in GCC states, could be a catalyst to build efficient e-government services.

Human Rights

Syria continues to face profound human-rights challenges shaped by years of conflict and widespread displacement. Protection systems remain overstretched, and accountability gaps persist. Rebuilding trust requires upholding due process, ensuring non-discrimination, and addressing unresolved disputes over civil documentation, housing, land and property (HLP) rights. Besides the unresolved disputes, many Syrians still lack essential civil documentation, limiting access to services, legal identity, and property rights. Women face additional barriers, with only a small proportion of property registered in their names. These issues continue to undermine

IDP and refugee return, reintegration, and social stability. Ensuring equal enjoyment of civil, economic, social and cultural rights, including meaningful access to and participation in cultural life, is essential to restoring dignity, strengthening social cohesion, and supporting sustainable recovery. A strengthened protection framework will be critical to support safe mobility, reduce vulnerability, and enable effective recovery planning.

Transitional Justice, Social Cohesion and Peacebuilding

Transitional justice is a core pillar of Syria's pathway toward sustainable peace, inclusive governance, and national reconciliation following more than a decade of conflict characterized by widespread violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. The UN system, in partnership with international and Syrian actors, has supported multiple transitional justice dimensions including documentation of violations, accountability efforts, institutional reform, victim-centered approaches, and restitution of housing, land, and property rights. However, access to justice, truth finding, and reparations remains limited for many victims, while institutional fragmentation and capacity gaps persist. A national transitional justice and missing persons commissions have been established, and key steps are taken, including the preparation of draft legislation. Yet a credible and effective process will require a unified national vision, an inclusive participation of affected communities, and sustained international support to advance truth-seeking, reparations, and reconciliation.

While the political transition has generated some positive signals toward more harmonious societies, it has also triggered abrupt shifts in power dynamics, leaving some groups excluded and exacerbating sectarian and regional grievances. The social fabric has been weakened, reshaped, or divided by years of conflict, creating significant challenges for returnees seeking to reintegrate into communities. These challenges are particularly acute for individuals returning from abroad, from displacement sites, or from camps such as Al-Hol and Al-Roj, who often face stigmatization, protection risks, and limited pathways to reintegration.

Finally, the political transition and ongoing peace and stabilization efforts present a critical opportunity to scale up initiatives that reinforce both horizontal and vertical cohesion by rebuilding trust among communities and restoring confidence between citizens and institutions. Addressing these dynamics requires a comprehensive peacebuilding architecture (at supranational, national, and subnational levels) combined with integrated, conflict-sensitive programming. It is vital to support a more stable and cohesive future for Syria that includes sustained, multi-layered peacebuilding approaches integrated into just reconstruction efforts. These initiatives should prioritize dialogue, mediation, and community-based initiatives aimed at strengthening social cohesion and reinforce inclusive civic engagement and local conflict-resolution mechanisms essential to prevent renewed violence.

Social Development (People)

No Poverty

Poverty remains extremely high with 90 per cent of the population living below the international poverty line by the end of 2024. Yet recent targeted interventions show that progress is possible when resources are well-directed. The collapse in purchasing power, inflationary pressures, and weakened household resilience have elevated malnutrition among children under five, even in areas where support is consistently delivered in partnership with communities and local authorities. During the conflict, social welfare systems have been severely disrupted, and large segments of the population continue to rely on extreme coping strategies such as child labor, early marriage, or reduced food consumption. Female-headed households, older persons, persons with disabilities and children face disproportionate poverty levels and uneven hardship. A comprehensive Multidimensional Poverty Needs Assessment is required with a particular focus on vulnerable groups. This granulated and nationally representative assessment would provide essential evidence to inform the UNSDCF as well as national strategies. Expanding poverty reduction initiatives will require sustained international support, alongside a more coherent and nationally owned social protection system.

Zero Hunger

Food insecurity remains severe in Syria, reflecting a prolonged socioeconomic decline, climate shocks, and weakened agrifood systems putting the country off track on SDG 2. In 2026, approximately 13.3 million people need food and agricultural assistance, including those facing or at risk of acute food insecurity. The food security sector partners collectively target approximately 4 million individuals with food assistance, including 100 percent of the severely food-insecure and 50 percent of the moderately food-insecure.

Most households report resorting to negative coping strategies including shifting to less preferred foods and reducing meal sizes. Female-headed households are particularly affected, with one in five reporting that family members go to bed hungry. Below-average rainfall, heatwaves, and contamination of farmland by unexploded ordnance (including anti-personnel landmines) have increased negligence of farming land that exacerbates food insecurity. Additionally, damaged irrigation systems and high input costs (due to trade barriers) have pushed wheat harvests to one of the lowest levels in decades, doubling the cost of a healthy diet (from about US$2.5 PPP in 2017 to US$5.7 in 2024).

Strengthening social safety nets to protect access to quality diets should not be underestimated. Nutrition services currently reach only about half the country, leaving a large caseload of children at risk of stunting and related mortality. One in four (25percent) children under five are stunted in 2024, almost two million children in child food poverty, and around 31 per cent of women and adolescent girls (15-49) have anemia in 2023, reinforcing intergenerational malnutrition. Meeting immediate needs while improving long-term food security will require linking food assistance to broader strategies including revitalizing the domestic agrifood systems. It is also important to promote nutrition-sensitive diversification and scale up fortified foods for children and vulnerable groups.

Good Health and Wellbeing

Years of conflict and economic deterioration have severely strained Syria's health system, leaving many facilities damaged, health supply chains disrupted, and large segments of the population dependent on humanitarian health services. Only 57 per cent of hospitals and 37 per cent of primary healthcare centers are fully functional, with widespread health workforce shortages, and persistent gaps in essential medicines. Recent efforts supported by international partners have helped stabilize key services in several areas. Going forward, if stabilization is sustained, WHO projects a drop in maternal mortality from 58 to 40 deaths per 100,000 live births and infant mortality from 19 to 9 deaths per 1,000 births by 2030. These projections assume investments in reproductive, maternal, newborn and child health (RMNCH) services, and restoration of women's access to skilled birth attendants and emergency obstetric care. (See Annex A, Figure 3).

Building on the 2030 targets, the UN is currently supporting the government to expand primary healthcare networks, rebuild human resource capacity, and improve access to essential medicines, including chronic diseases. Mental health and psychosocial support remain critical needs, particularly for women, girls, and displaced communities, while reproductive health services, forensic-medical support for survivors of gender-based violence, and rehabilitation services require significant scale-up. Strengthening regulatory systems, integrating telehealth solutions, and improving the efficiency of health supply chains can accelerate recovery efforts and move Syria toward a more resilient and nationally owned health system.

Education

Years of conflict, displacement, and shrinking public finances have placed severe strain on Syria's education system, with 40 per cent of schools damaged or non-operational and over seven million learners and teachers requiring assistance in 2024. Despite modest increases in the education budget, real-term allocations remain far below the needed resources, limiting the system's ability to respond to rising needs, especially as more than 2.4 million children remain out of school. Multi-shift schedules, overcrowding, and deteriorated infrastructure continue to affect learning conditions and outcomes, while many families resort to harmful coping strategies.

Children with disabilities face the highest exclusion rates due to the lack of adequate facilities and specialized support.

Further investment in teacher development, educational materials, and school infrastructure is essential to improve educational outcomes. Technical and vocational education requires particular attention to ensure young Syrians acquire skills relevant to the evolving labor market. Non-formal education pathways remain essential for reaching children who have missed years of schooling, preparing them for reintegration into formal education or productive employment. New technologies that reduce education costs, and secure faster access to education and knowledge transfer are worth exploring.

Water and Sanitation

Adequate sanitation facilities remain a challenge for many households, particularly in areas of displacement and informal settlements. Overall, the Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) implementation stands at 63 (medium-high) in 2023, below the SDG 6.5.1 target of 90, with financing identified as the weakest component. Syria is suffering from severe water scarcity, this is mainly due to continuous over-exploitation and irrational, unregulated and unsustainable use of limited and declined surface and groundwater resources. The current per capita share of conventional and non-conventional renewable water is less than 675 m^3 per year, which is significantly less than the water-poverty limit (1,000 m^3 per year). Wastewater treatment is limited to major cities such as Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo with decreased efficiency. A decrease of 30 to 40 percent in technical staff has been reported as they have either fled the country or retired[6,7]. It is estimated that restoration of pre-conflict WASH services will require US$ 10 billion invested over 8–10 years, while an additional US$ 1 billion annually to sustain services. Addressing these gaps requires critical rehabilitation of existing WASH infrastructure alongside expanding infrastructure projects to improve sanitation, strengthen public health, and enhance quality of life. Water resource management also demands careful attention to ensure sustainability, particularly given the severe impact of climate change on water availability.

Housing, Land, and Property

Fourteen years of conflict have deepened long-standing urban pressures in Syria, where rapid pre-2011 rural-to-urban migration and weak planning systems had already generated widespread informal settlements. It is estimated that 31 per cent of the housing stock, which amounts to 1.32 million housing units, has been damaged or destroyed, [8]with millions (particularly IDPs in the northwest and northeast), still relying on inadequate shelters. HLP disputes remain common, especially in areas of return, driven by inheritance disputes, unclear boundaries, and missing documentation, all of which continue to deter safe and voluntary returns.

Recovering HLP rights is a key aspect of transitional justice. Strengthening legal systems and community engagement is critical to enhance housing security and land rights, supporting durable solutions for those affected by displacement. Recovery of HLP rights is essential for economic recovery, civil peace, enabling investment, and providing the security needed to encourage returns. Rethinking Awqaf (religious endowments), asset utilization also offers a promise. Awqaf land and other assets, if transparently and inclusively managed, can be leveraged to provide affordable housing, support community infrastructure, and fund social protection programs for vulnerable groups.

Economic Transformation (Prosperity)

Syria's economy shows early signs of stabilization, backed up by improved security conditions and continued international support. Coherent macroeconomic governance, revival of productive sectors, investment in climate-resilient infrastructure, and overall institutional reforms are still working in progress.

[6] United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) and UNEP-DHI (2025)
[7] 2024 Progress Report on the Implementation of Integrated Water Resources Management in the Arab Region: Midterm status of Sustainable Development Goal indicator 651
[8] Syria National Housing Profile, Ministry of Public Works and Housing, Syrian Arab Republic & UN-Habitat, 2026/forthcoming.

Macro-Fiscal Stability

Recent public statements by the Syrian President have conveyed an expectation of strong GDP growth in the near term, reflecting official optimism regarding the pace of economic recovery. While these GDP estimates may indicate improved sentiment and emerging opportunities, they will need to be matched by sustained gains in production, investment, trade, and financial sector normalization to translate into broad-based and durable recovery. Fiscal space expanded but also still constrained as fiscal revenues remain narrow and volatile. Tax collection is weak, and budget allocations to essential sectors are far below required levels. Public-sector wages have lost most of their value, prompting restructuring efforts and temporary external salary support.

The monetary system remains fragile, with parallel exchange rates, liquidity shortages, low foreign currency reserves, and weak banking supervision. Sanctions relief has opened opportunities for improved financial connectivity and expanded space for central banks to establish a coherent monetary regime. However, without a unified exchange rate, credible monetary governance, and a credible banking sector capable of intermediating savings into investment, the economy will remain cash-based, dollarized, and vulnerable to renewed instability. These are vital pre-conditions to restore trust, attract investment, and enabling financial inflows to support effective recovery. Furthermore, on the fiscal front, comprehensive Public Financial Management (PFM) reforms anchored in a transparent budget, improved and transparent fiscal revenue administrations, and efficient spending are essential to restore overall macro-fiscal discipline and public trust.

Labor markets

Labor markets in Syria remain disrupted in 2025 and unemployment is high. The magnitude of this challenge becomes evident as it resulted in 90 per cent of the population now living below the poverty line, creating an urgent imperative for holistic economic recovery strategies. Additionally, with 16.5 million people requiring humanitarian assistance and food prices reaching 100 times pre-conflict levels[9], the informal economy has become a survival mechanism for millions of Syrians. This informality, while providing immediate livelihood opportunities, undermines long-term productivity growth. According to the World Bank Syria's reconstruction needs estimated at $216 billion in 2025[10]. Given this background, Government strategies need to expand beyond traditional macroeconomic stability to encompass critical dimensions of poverty reduction, unemployment reduction, employment creation, and productivity enhancement all at once. To structurally address these gaps, the Government of Syria in collaboration with the UN is planning a national labor force survey to assess the scale of employment issues including informality, poverty and the working poor. This survey will help design tailored employment and social protection policies.

In alignment with international labour standards, Syria's labor legislations require systematic compliance with ILO core conventions to support sustainable recovery and attract responsible investment. Several key conventions remain unratified, notably Convention C029 (Forced Labour) and C182 (Worst Forms of Child Labour) among many others. Technical assistance from ILO will support both compliance and market access for Syrian exports to markets in developed countries having these conventions as a key entry to import from developing and least developing countries.

Agricultural sector

Syria's vegetation map has significantly changed in many areas over the 14 years of conflict where strategies that might have worked previously may no longer be effective. At the same time, the agricultural sector is considered the biggest employer in Syria and might be the most strategic sector to fight poverty and vulnerability during the recovery process. Agriculture in Syria continues to operate under severe strain from conflict-related damage, displacement, asset loss and UXO contamination. Production needs such as manpower, water availability, access to inputs and finance, and affordable energy (Annex A, Figure 5) are absent. This makes farmers face high

[9] https://www.wfp.org/publications/annual-country-reports-syrian-arab-republic
[10] https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099844407042516353

production costs and frequent shocks without adequate risk-management systems, contributing to rural poverty and reduced domestic food production. The recovery of the agricultural sector is also constrained by structural weaknesses and environmental stressors. In 2025, the impact of drought was large to a point where you can visually see from satellite images the degradation of green areas if one compares 2024 and 2025 (Annex A, Figure 7, 7.1,7.2).

To see impact, developing and strengthening the technical, entrepreneurial, and adaptive skills of farmers, workers, and local communities is essential. Investments in irrigation rationing, farming infrastructure, renewable energy, and sustainable and climate-resilient practices offer a viable pathway to restart agricultural production. By restoring agricultural functionality, this will stabilize food prices, and create much-needed employment opportunities, contributing to poverty reduction, inclusive economic recovery and overall social stability.

Industrial Sector

In Syria, the industrial sector remains hampered by large-scale destruction, energy shortages, damaged infrastructure, obsolete equipment and limited access to finance. These issues mainly impact MSMEs that accounts for 95 per cent of Syria's private sector activity. Reviving Syria's industrial sector and supporting MSMEs in different industries requires a systemic and coordinated approach. Industrial production requires restoring quality infrastructure and reducing energy cost—particularly through grid rehabilitation and distributed solar solutions, in order to lower operating costs and reconnect production corridors. Also, a supportive business environment—through streamlined business registration, modernized customs, stronger competition policy, and expanded digital tools, will enable firms to start, scale and formalize. Besides agriculture, industrial recovery is a key driver of stability and job creation in Syria.

Environment, Climate Change and Energy (Planet)

The Eastern Mediterranean temperature is projected by 2050 to increase to 1.5-2.0°C, coupled with a 10-20 percent decrease in precipitation. This fundamentally alters the country's environmental baseline and adaptation requirements (IPCC AR6, 2023)[11]. These climate projections intersect with Syria's current humanitarian crisis, creating cascading vulnerabilities that demand integrated environmental and social responses (HNRP 2025)[12]. The institutional capacity to prevent, absorb, adapt, and mitigate environmental shocks remains severely compromised, especially since public hospitals and primary health care centers are partially operational. This level of functionality makes Syria's health system inadequate to respond to climate-related health emergencies or vector-borne diseases that may increase with changing precipitation patterns.[13] Looking forward, an expected increase in drought frequency significantly poses direct threats to agricultural systems in a country with millions are food-insecure[14,15]. Camps also present acute environmental vulnerabilities across the country. The energy sector is also deteriorating. Extensive damage to the electricity sector, combined with fuel shortages, and years of underinvestment, has severely limited access to reliable energy, making the restoration and reinforcement of electricity infrastructure and energy supply a foundational requirement for both recovery and development. Building on the assessment of Syria's environmental challenges, it is evident that Syria is experiencing elevated spikes of air pollution (Annex A Figure 6), a marked reduction in green areas (Annex A Figure 7.1,7.2), and worsening groundwater depletion. These trends are driven by persistent drought conditions, extensive damage to irrigation infrastructure, and the lack of effective regulatory oversight, all of which compound the pressures on natural resources. Higher pollution spikes are projected as lower precipitation is expected due to the global warming impact on the eastern Mediterranean.

[11] https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_LongerReport.pdf
[12] https://humanitarianaction.info/document/global-humanitarian-overview-2026/article/syrian-arab-republic-4
[13] https://humanitarianaction.info/plan/1276/document/syrian-arab-republic-humanitarian-response-priorities-january-december-2025/article/1-humanitarian-needs-1#:~:text=The percent20data percent20was percent20collected percent20after percent208 percent20December,gaps percent2C percent20and percent20strengthen percent20humanitarian percent20interventions percent20across percent20Syria.
[14] https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_LongerReport.pdf
[15] https://www.wfp.org/publications/annual-country-reports-syrian-arab-republic

Investing in climate and disaster risk management, renewable energy, sustainable land management, and climate-resilient agriculture reduces environmental impact and strengthens energy security. These investments also support industrial recovery and protect livelihoods, particularly in the short term. Equally important is the establishment of robust disaster loss and damage accounting and tracking systems and multi-hazard early-warning systems. Currently, the new Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management has begun to shape national strategies and frameworks to cope with multidimensional risks and disasters.

3. Population Groups at risk of being Left Behind

This section examines the situation of key vulnerable groups and identifies partnership opportunities for addressing their needs. Almost all issues mentioned previously have impacted Women, children, youth, older persons, persons with disabilities, and displaced communities. Addressing the needs of vulnerable populations is central to achieving sustainable development and social cohesion. The UN stands ready to support government efforts to ensure recovery that benefits all Syrians, with particular attention to those who face the greatest barriers in accessing services and opportunities.

Women, Girls and Children

Women and girls in Syria continue to face significant challenges including gender-based violence, limited access to education and healthcare, and reduced economic opportunities. The conflict has exacerbated existing gender inequalities, with women bearing disproportionate caregiving responsibilities while facing barriers to employment and education. Women's overall economic participation has declined, limiting household income and resilience, while constraining Syria's overall economic productivity. Women's labor force participation stands at merely 26percent in 2022.

Against the backdrop of Syria's complex humanitarian situation, social exclusion is driven by deeply rooted structural factors that continue to reinforce widespread marginalization. With millions of people requiring humanitarian assistance[12], discriminatory practices are compounded by systemic capacity gaps, particularly impacting women and girls. In this context, grassroots and civic organizations supporting women and girls play a dual role: while they themselves face significant operational challenges and risks, they also serve as vital agents for strengthening community resilience and promoting inclusive recovery.

Under UN SWAP 2.0, the Performance Indicators demand systematic integration of gender equality measures. Yet current assessments reveal gaps in comprehensive gender mainstreaming. Syria's ratification of all 8 Fundamental ILO Conventions, including C100 (Equal Remuneration) and C111 (Discrimination)[16], provides a legal foundation, but systematic compliance assessment with international labor standards remains insufficient. Similarly, adherence to human rights mechanisms, including CEDAW obligations and Beijing Platform for Action commitments, requires more rigorous monitoring frameworks. With GBV services available in only 40 percent of sub-districts (UNFPA, 2024), the urgency of embedding women's empowerment principles throughout all programming becomes evident. Strengthening both social inclusion analysis and UN SWAP compliance will ensure that Syria's recovery trajectory addresses structural inequalities while building institutional capacity for sustained gender-responsive development.

In 2024, violations affecting children in armed conflict persisted into 2025 amid ongoing hostilities: 672 children were killed or maimed (mostly by explosive ordnance); 527 were recruited or used by armed actors; 70 attacks targeted schools and hospitals; and 14 children were abducted. Around 1,000 children remained detained for alleged association with armed groups, while approximately 25,500 children with suspected family ties to Da'esh remained in Al-Hol and Roj camps under conditions of legal ambiguity and high protection risk. [17]

[16] https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11200:0::NO::P11200_COUNTRY_ID:102923
[17] United Nations General Assembly and Security Council 2025 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, A/79/878-S/2025/247 (17 June 202)

Demonstrating a shared commitment to inclusion and the meaningful political participation of women will help build trust and offer tangible pathways towards advancing the rights and wellbeing of women and girls throughout Syria. For children, strengthening child protection systems, providing psychosocial support services, and ensuring access to healthcare and nutrition can address the holistic needs of Syria's boys and girls. Also, access to quality education represents an investment for all children in Syria's future human capital. Every child in Syria who returns to learning, represents hope for Syria's sustainable development and long-term prosperity.

Youth

Empowering youth is fundamental to advancing sustainable development in Syria. However, young people, including adolescents, continue to face considerable obstacles in accessing health services, education, and employment opportunities. Persistent high levels of youth unemployment restrict economic prospects and fuel frustration among those eager to contribute positively to their country's future. Given that youth represent a large portion of Syria's population and hold immense potential, coordinated and targeted efforts are essential to prevent the risk of a lost generation. Effectively addressing these barriers not only supports the achievement of SDG 8—promoting decent work and economic growth—but also strengthens social and political stability and drives national development.

Older Persons

Similar to the rest of the society, older persons in Syria often lack access to adequate social services and health care, with many living in poverty after losing savings, property, or family support during the years of conflict. All these factors led to financial insecurity, neglect, and psychosocial distress. Age-related health needs frequently go unaddressed, while discrimination based on age compounds challenges in accessing services, employment, and community participation.

Older Syrians bring invaluable knowledge, experience, and social capital that can contribute to community healing, reconciliation, and cultural continuity. Collaborating on inclusive social protection policies, expanding healthcare access for the elderly, and creating opportunities for intergenerational engagement can strengthen community trust, while demonstrating commitment to the principle of leaving no one behind. Greater age-inclusive planning, tailored health and protection services, and implementation of the National Strategy for Older Persons (adopted in 2023) are needed.

Persons with Disabilities

The number of Syrians living with disabilities has increased significantly as a result of the conflict. They face heightened barriers to services and opportunities. For instance, accessibility barriers in the built and industrial infrastructure, transportation, and communication exclude many persons with disabilities from full participation in education, social and economic activities. Persistent discrimination further compounds these challenges, while critical services—including rehabilitation, assistive technologies, and specialized healthcare are largely inaccessible or insufficient. Moreover, lingering hazards such as unexploded ordnance continue to contribute to increasing disability rates, even after the change in regime.

Ensuring inclusivity for persons with disabilities is essential for truly leaving no one behind in Syria's recovery. Inclusive education, accessible services, and strengthened rehabilitation systems are critical priorities. The UN is ready to support the Government of Syria to improve physical accessibility, combat discrimination, expand rehabilitation services, and promote inclusive education and employment. These measures can build societal trust, while demonstrating that all Syrians have value to contribute to national development.

Internally Displaced Persons, Returnees, and Refugees

Millions of Syrians remain displaced, facing precarious living conditions both within the country and in neighboring states that have generously hosted refugee populations. Syria remains one of the world's largest displacement crises, with nearly half the pre-conflict population still displaced. Internal displacement persists at scale, with 6.14 million IDPs and 900,000 new displacements in 2025. Since December 2024, returns have accelerated. By October 2025, more than one million refugees and 1.9 million IDPs had returned, driven by

renewed hopes for stability. Yet conditions inside Syria remain difficult, with widespread housing destruction, limited services, crippled productive economy, constrained livelihoods, and unresolved HLP issues deterring many from returning. IDPs and returnees often encounter challenges related to documentation, HLP rights, as well as limited access to basic services in areas of displacement or return. For current refugees, security concerns, destroyed infrastructure, lack of livelihoods, and limited services are complicating families' decisions about return and durable solutions. Funding gaps also hamper progress toward durable solutions.

Many refugees and asylum-seekers inside Syria, from Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Yemen, remain highly vulnerable and dependent on assistance. Palestine Refugees, approximately 418,000 individuals in total of whom 30 percent remain in protracted displacement, face even deeper hardship, marked by high poverty, severe food insecurity, damaged or destroyed camps, and limited access to essential services. Such hardship is particularly affecting women, girls, youth, and returnees (both cross-border and IDPs). Engaging in comprehensive approaches to durable solutions – whether voluntary return, local integration, or resettlement – requires addressing HLP issues, restoring services, rebuilding infrastructure, and creating livelihood opportunities. Progress on displacement solutions will enhance stability, trust, and confidence in Syria's future trajectory. The UN is ready to work together with the Government of Syria to create conditions for safe, voluntary, and dignified return, while ensuring protection and assistance for those who remain displaced.

Regional dynamics

Syria's recovery is deeply embedded in its regional environment. Geography, trade corridors, water systems, energy networks, and population movements bind Syria's future to that of its neighbors. As Syria advances along a nationally led recovery trajectory, the country is positioned not only as a recipient of regional engagement, but as a prospective contributor to regional stability, economic integration, and shared prosperity. Renewed diplomatic engagement and Syria's reintegration into regional frameworks have reopened political, economic, and technical channels. These developments create opportunities to restore regional trade and transport linkages, cooperate on displacement solutions, mobilize investment, and strengthen shared approaches to water management, climate adaptation, and energy transition.

The region continues to shape Syria's recovery through refugee hosting, trade access, financial connectivity, and shared environmental systems. Decisions related to mobility, market integration, and infrastructure connectivity will influence the pace of returns, labor market recovery, and investment flows.

At the same time, Syria's recovery carries regional dividends. Progress in stabilization, institutional reform, and economic revitalization reduces displacement pressures, restores trade routes, strengthens food systems, and supports broader regional stability. Revitalized Syrian agriculture and industry can contribute to regional value chains, employment creation, and food security. Structured regional cooperation and South-South partnerships offer a powerful recovery multiplier. Anchored in national priorities, regional engagement can mobilize investment, transfer knowledge, align infrastructure development, and address transboundary risks, reinforcing Syria's recovery and development while advancing shared regional interests.

4. Enabling Environment

Sustainable recovery requires financing reform, diversified partnerships, risk-informed governance, and strengthened national data systems. The Government of Syria remains the primary development partner, supported by civil society, the private sector, regional actors, and international institutions.

Sustainable development in Syria requires an enabling environment that supports progress across all dimensions, underpinned by adequate financing, effective partnerships, strong institutions, and proactive risk management. The Common Country Analysis and its forward-looking scenario outlook converge on a central message: Syria's development trajectory will be shaped not by a single factor, but by the degree to which political stabilization, economic engagement, institutional reform, and recovery financing advance together within a coherent national framework.

Where these elements align, they generate mutually reinforcing gains across governance, livelihoods, services, and social cohesion. Where progress is fragmented, recovery advances more slowly and unevenly. If stabilization deepens, institutions are progressively strengthened, and recovery investments are sequenced around visible improvements in people's daily lives, Syria can move toward a future characterized by greater stability, restored dignity, and expanding opportunity. In this framing, recovery is not only the rebuilding of assets, but the rebuilding of systems—economic, social, and institutional—that enable Syrians themselves to shape a peaceful, resilient, and prosperous future. Integration and cohesion require immediate de-mining action and UXO clearance and electricity coverage across the board. Scaling up on these critical areas will unlock land, increase efforts to return and enhance basic services availability.

Development pathways: managing risks

Syria's recovery will unfold within a complex but manageable risk environment shaped by political, economic, social, security, and environmental factors. Syria's Multidimensional SDG Risk Analysis frames these not as fixed constraints, but as dynamic conditions that can be mitigated through nationally led, forward-looking policies, strengthened institutions, and coordinated partnerships. Political confidence influences investment; economic resilience shapes livelihoods and service delivery; social inclusion underpins cohesion; and climate and environmental pressures increasingly determine food security, water availability, and long-term sustainability. Addressing these dimensions in an integrated manner significantly strengthens recovery prospects. A central conclusion is that risk mitigation is most effective when embedded within national systems rather than treated as stand-alone interventions. Strengthening institutions, improving coordination, enhancing data and early-warning capacities, and fostering inclusive participation reduce uncertainty and enable more predictable development trajectories. In this framing, risk management becomes a constructive partnership space—supporting anticipation, prevention, and adaptive response—through which development investments are protected and confidence is built.

To inform strategic choices, and after consultation with the Syrian government, the CCA will propose two forward-looking trajectories. An **Accelerated Recovery** pathway reflects conditions under which political stabilization advances, international economic engagement expands, and coordinated financing mobilizes at scale. In this context, reconstruction investment, diaspora engagement, and regional trade integration combine to drive economic recovery, employment creation, and institutional rebuilding, enabling faster reductions in poverty, displacement, and service gaps, while climate and infrastructure investments begin to secure long-term resilience. A **Gradual Stabilization** pathway reflects a more incremental trajectory, with partial normalization, moderate investment, and uneven recovery. Under this scenario, improvements continue, but at a slower pace: economic growth remains constrained, poverty reduction is modest, displacement solutions advance unevenly, and climate vulnerabilities persist.

Across both pathways, outcomes improvement assumes a set of mutually reinforcing priorities are advanced together: Strengthening governance and institutions to build trust and accountability; restoring productive capacity and connectivity across agriculture, industry, trade, finance, and labour markets; investing in people and social systems to rebuild human capital and social cohesion; advancing durable solutions to displacement through integrated, area-based approaches; and embedding climate and environmental resilience into national recovery planning. When pursued as an integrated national package, these priorities create positive feedback loops in which stronger institutions enable investment, investment supports services and livelihoods, improved living conditions build public confidence, and trust, in turn, deepens reform momentum and stabilization.

The scale and effectiveness of recovery will ultimately depend on the convergence of national reform efforts, regional and international engagement, and diversified recovery financing. Progress in public financial management, regulatory quality, and investment frameworks expands Syria's ability to mobilize resources, engage the diaspora, and attract private-sector participation. Within this context, the United Nations positions itself as a supportive partner to a nationally owned process—accompanying institutional recovery, facilitating technical cooperation and partnerships, strengthening national data and planning systems, and aligning humanitarian, recovery, and development instruments. Managed strategically, Syria's risk landscape becomes not only a

challenge to navigate, but a foundation upon which to build more resilient institutions, a more diversified economy, and a more cohesive society, advancing steady progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals.

Financial Landscape

Syria's financial landscape is shaped by fragile macro-fiscal conditions. As mentioned in previous sections GDP remains below pre-conflict levels, fiscal space is constrained, and public revenues are narrow and volatile. Relying on tax collection as a domestic source of resource mobilization is neither sufficient nor reliable at this stage of recovery. Monetary fragility persists with a largely cash-based economy and a limited role of the banking sector in financing operations. These constraints directly influence the scale and effectiveness of recovery financing, making public financial management and monetary reforms a foundational requirement for confidence-building and sustainable financing.

Syria's recovery will require financing at a scale and over a time horizon that reflects both the depth of humanitarian need and the magnitude of reconstruction requirements. Humanitarian needs are estimated at approximately USD 3.2 billion for 2026 alone, while reconstruction needs were assessed at around USD 216 billion in 2025.[18] Mobilizing resources at this scale will depend not only on external support, but also on restoring confidence in Syria's public financial management systems and economic governance.

Alongside bilateral and multilateral assistance, Syria has the potential to diversify its financing base through innovative, and complementary mechanisms. Leveraging the Syrian diaspora, including an estimated 5.5 million registered refugees in neighboring countries, [19] through diaspora bonds and facilitated remittance and investment channels could mobilize additional financial and human capital for recovery. Sharia-compliant instruments, such as sukuk, offer further opportunities to attract new categories of investors, while green bonds represent a promising avenue to finance climate adaptation, environmental rehabilitation, and sustainable infrastructure.[20] In parallel, re-envisioning the strategic use of Awqaf (religious endowment) assets could generate sustainable domestic revenue streams to support social protection, community development, and public goods provision. If governed transparently and aligned with national development priorities, Awqaf returns could strengthen social cohesion while channeling resources toward inclusive recovery. Financing Syria's recovery will require an integrated approach that balances immediate humanitarian assistance with scaled development finance for reconstruction, institutional reform, and peacebuilding. Recent steps toward easing certain sanctions represent an enabling development in this regard, opening space for increased international economic engagement, investment, trade, and financial flows that can support growth, job creation, and long-term recovery. Aligning financial reform, diversified financing instruments, and international engagement within a coherent national framework will be critical to translating these opportunities into sustained development outcomes.

Sanctions have historically shaped Syria's financing landscape by limiting banking intermediation and concentrating external support in humanitarian channels. Recent sanctions lifting and SWIFT system reintegration signal a potential shift toward recovery-oriented financing domestically, regionally, and internationally. Translating these openings into tangible gains will depend on sustained confidence-building in macro-fiscal and financial institutions, regulatory clarity, and institutional reform.

Stakeholder and Partnership Analysis

The Government of Syria is the primary partner in the development process, ensuring a nationally led approach grounded in the principles of national sovereignty and national ownership. This partnership provides the foundation for aligning United Nations support with national priorities and for reinforcing government-led coordination of recovery and development efforts. Line ministries, local authorities, and national institutions are central counterparts for policy formulation, planning, and implementation across sectors, and will remain pivotal to strengthening institutional capacity and service delivery.

[18] https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099844407042516353
[19] https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria
[20] https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_LongerReport.pdf

Civil society organizations play a complementary and essential role in service delivery, community engagement, fostering social cohesion, and advocacy for vulnerable populations. Their proximity to communities and contextual knowledge enables more responsive, inclusive, and accountable programming, particularly in hard-to-reach and fragile settings. The private sector also represents a critical driver of recovery. Revitalizing domestic enterprise, attracting investment, and enabling small and medium-sized businesses will be central to job creation, innovation, and the rebuilding of productive capacity. Establishing an enabling environment for private sector development is therefore a core pillar of sustainable economic transformation.

Beyond traditional bilateral and multilateral cooperation, South-South and triangular cooperation offer valuable modalities for advancing Syria's recovery and sustainable development. These partnerships provide opportunities to exchange experience, co-develop context-relevant solutions, and leverage technical expertise across the Global South, including in areas such as displacement and durable solutions, social protection systems, climate resilience, and economic revitalization. Regional engagement opportunities are expanding, including through Syria's reintegration into regional diplomatic and economic frameworks. The resumption of engagement within the Arab League has reopened channels for political dialogue, trade, investment, and technical cooperation that can reinforce domestic recovery efforts.

International financial institutions and development partners will also be critical stakeholders in mobilizing resources, supporting institutional reform, and financing large-scale recovery and reconstruction. Triangular cooperation, facilitated by the United Nations and partners, can further amplify impact by combining the comparative advantages of developing and developed countries. Systematically integrating South-South and triangular cooperation into Syria's partnership framework can strengthen national capacities, accelerate progress toward the SDGs, and support recovery pathways that are inclusive, resilient, and sustainable.

5. Conclusions and Opportunities

Syria enters 2026 at a decisive turning point. Fourteen years of conflict have left deep and multidimensional setbacks across the SDGs. Yet the analysis also confirms that 2025 created meaningful openings: political and regional re-engagement, early steps toward economic liberalization, and the start of a nationally led recovery trajectory. This creates a realistic opportunity to shift from a predominantly humanitarian footing toward an integrated recovery, reconstruction, and longer-term sustainable development if progress is deliberately inclusive and grounded in trust-building. Recovery and reconstruction depend on the deliberate integration of humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding, and development action within a coherent national framework, rather than the pursuit of stand-alone or sector-specific interventions. Humanitarian action remains essential to save lives and stabilize communities where peacebuilding is required to address the drivers of conflict, exclusion, and mistrust. Finally, development investments are necessary to rebuild systems, institutions, and productive capacity. When these dimensions are aligned and sequenced as part of integrated packages, they reinforce one another and reduce the risk of fragmented or temporary gains.

A central message of this CCA is that trust is the enabling condition for every transition Syria seeks to make. This could go from stability to durable peace, from relief to recovery systems, and from survival livelihoods to productive growth. Trust will be rebuilt through visible improvements in basic services, fair and predictable rules, strengthened rule of law, protection of rights, access to legal identity and civil documentation, and practical resolution of housing, land and property (HLP) claims especially for women, displaced people, and returnees. Equally, trust depends on meaningful participation of women, youth, persons with disabilities, older persons, minorities, and affected communities in decision-making and recovery oversight, so that "leaving no one behind" becomes a lived reality rather than an aspiration.

The CCA concludes that Syria's recovery prospects improve substantially when priorities are pursued as an integrated package rather than in isolation. Restoring essential infrastructure and services (energy, water, health,

education, housing) is inseparable from restoring institutional performance and accountability. At the same time, reviving agri food systems and industry is inseparable from financial connectivity, predictable regulation, and access to finance. Also, advancing durable solutions to displacement is inseparable from HLP security, documentation, protection, and service restoration; and building climate resilience is inseparable from economic recovery, food security, and risk governance. Furthermore, digital transformation will be a key cross-sectoral enabler with the development of comprehensive national digital systems and the principle of digital sovereignty[21].

The CCA outlined four areas that will require coordinated and integrated support. In **Politics and Governance (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions)**, it is essential to consolidate inclusive and unified institutions that enable effective governance structures, integration of security forces, and rule of law through transitional justice and accountability mechanisms. A process should be supported to guarantee full and meaningful participation of Syrian women, and to foster trust and reconciliation among communities, including housing, land and property rights issues. Protection of human rights for vulnerable populations should be upheld. **Social Development (People)** calls for investments to enhance health, education, basic infrastructures, housing, entrepreneurship, and social protection services that benefit all citizens. It is also critical to empower youth, women, and vulnerable groups to drive inclusive growth. **Economic Transformation (Prosperity)** should focus on strategic reforms to promote inclusive growth, attract investment, and create employment opportunities, particularly for women and youth. It also requires rehabilitation of critical productive infrastructure, including rebuilding connectivity (physical, digital, and market based social connections) that enable economic activity, service delivery, and community cohesion. In the area of **Energy, Environment and Climate Change (Planet),** emphasis should be placed on protecting natural resources, addressing climate vulnerabilities, promoting sustainable industrial practices and clean energy solutions, and ensuring a healthy environment for future generations. These areas are deeply interconnected and mutually reinforcing, creating virtuous cycles of development. Together, they form a shared agenda aligned with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

The UN's role, as framed by this CCA, is to accompany a nationally owned pathway in supporting institutional recovery, facilitating partnerships and financing, strengthening data systems, and advancing inclusiveness, while ensuring alignment with the 2030 Agenda. The scenario analysis highlights that development outcomes will vary significantly, depending on the pace of stabilization and recovery financing, underscoring the need for an adaptive Cooperation Framework capable of operating across multiple plausible futures. If national priorities, international engagement, and inclusive implementation converge around trust-building and measurable improvements in people's daily lives, Syria can move toward a future defined by greater stability, dignity, and shared opportunity—where recovery is not only about rebuilding what was lost, but about building stronger systems that deliver for all Syrians.

[21] "Statement of Recovery Priorities for International Cooperation", Syrian Arab Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, International Cooperation Department, March 2026.

ANNEXES

Annex A: Statistical Data and Figures

Figures

Figure 1: Progress towards SDG targets



Figure 2: SDG Progress



Source: ESCWA calculation from Arab SDG 22Monitor.

Figure 3: Maternal and Infant Mortality Rates



[22] https://arabsdgmonitor.unescwa.org/data-availabilty/index.html?o=1

Figure 5: Nightlight satellite images: Intensity levels at the national level.



Source: Calculation based on Google Earth night light satellite imagery.

Figure 6: Smoothed Average pollution in Damascus 2012-2025



Source: Calculation using Earth Engine by Google Earth.
Note: Measures how much airborne particulate matter (aerosols such as dust, smoke, soot, and pollution) **blocks or scatters sunlight** in the atmosphere.

Figure 7: VEGETATION INDEX (NDVI) at the national level.



7.1: Vegetation mapping in 2024



7.2: Vegetation mapping in 2025



Source: Calculation based on NASA MODIS Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) Data.

Annex B: Statistic Compendium

The CCA analysis provides a UN independent and forward-looking assessment of Syria's current socio-economic, humanitarian and recovery landscape, drawing upon available official data sources, assessments conducted by UN entities, and innovative analytical tools including satellite imagery and geospatial proxies that help fill data gaps where official statistics are unavailable.

Whilst the CCA's recognizes Syria's multidimensional recovery needs, data and statistical capacity gaps fundamentally constrain evidence-based planning and SDG monitoring, which will need to be addressed to support any recovery plan's implementation and track progress toward sustainable development.[23] The Central Bureau of Statistics will require substantial technical and institutional support to rebuild core functions, establish modern data collection methodologies, and develop integrated monitoring systems aligned with SDG frameworks so to strengthen Syria's ability to measure effectiveness of interventions and enhance accountability mechanisms that are essential for rebuilding trust between institutions and communities.

Indicator	Value
Demographics	
Total population	24.4 million August 2025 (Estimates)
Refugees return since Dec 2024	over 1,000,000 since Dec 2024 (2025)
IDP returns since Dec 2024	1,900,000 since Dec 2024 (2025)
Internally displaced persons (total)	6,140,000 (Oct 2025)
Newly displaced persons	892,000 (2025)
Site-registered IDPs	1,400,000 (Sept 2025)
Registered refugees and asylum seekers in Syria	15,255 (Aug 2025)
Refugees and asylum seekers who are children	37 percent (2025)
Palestine refugees in Syria	~418,000 (recent)
IDPs who are female	51 percent (2025)
Women and girls under 30 among IDPs	33 percent (2025)
IDPs under 18	23 percent (2025)
Women heading households	33 percent (recent)
People in need who are persons with disabilities	17 percent (2024)
People estimated to live with a disability	25 to 33 percent of population (recent)
Development & SDGs	
ESCWA Global Development Index rank	from 136 in 2010 to 157 in 2023
SDG targets with sufficient data	46 percent (2025)
SDG targets with insufficient data	11 percent (2025)
SDG targets with no data	43 percent (2025)
Global SDG targets measurable	43 percent (2025)
Measurable SDGs on track	19 percent (2025)
Measurable SDGs in progress	52 percent (2025)
Measurable SDGs off track	29 percent (2025)

[23] The last national population census conducted in 2004 and the last Household Income and Expenditure Survey conducted in 2009 (CBS Syria). According to ESCWA's SDG comprehensive assessment, Syria has data for only 32 percent of SDG indicators (https://www.unescwa.org/portal/arab-sdg-monitor) representing one of the lowest coverage rates globally. According to UNFPA, some progress has been seen in gender-disaggregated data collection, with female-headed households representing 33 percent of all households, however, comprehensive age and disability disaggregation remains inconsistent.

Human Development Index rank	119 in 2011; 159 in 2023; 162 in 2025
Economy	
Market exchange rate	50 SYP/USD in 2010; 15,000 in Nov 2024; 11,800 in Nov 2025
Inflation (average)	50 percent (average in recent years)
Consumer Price Index increase	Increased 200-fold between 2010 and 2025
Unemployment rate	23.7 percent in 2022
Women labour force participation	from 13 percent in 2010 to 26 percent in 2022
Women unemployment rate	from 22 percent in 2010 to 27 percent in 2022
Youth unemployment rate	51.7 percent (2022); est ILO 2024 31.5 percent
Youth unemployment – young men	42 percent (2022); est ILO 2024 27.8 percent
Youth unemployment – young women	74 percent (2022); est ILO 2024 49.9 percent
National power generation capacity reduction	capacity fell by ~66 percent since pre-crisis
Earthquake damage to power sector	34.8 USD mn (Feb 2023)
MSMEs contribution to GDP	from 60 percent in 2011 to 30 percent in 2024
Micro- and small businesses closed due to 2023 earthquake	35,000 businesses
State budget	Approximately USD 2.83 bn
State budget (per capita)	USD 119.5 per capita
Budget increase (nominal)	115 percent increase between 2023 and 2024
Tax revenue	from 12 percent of GDP in 2019 to 6.4 percent in 2023
Public debt	from 10 percent of GDP in 2019 to 12 percent in 2023
Health budget share	6.5 percent of the 2024 budget
Health spending	USD 185m in 2024
Health spending per capita	USD 8.5 per person in 2024 (WHO recommended benchmark USD86/person)
Education budget share	7.1 percent of the budget in 2011; 3.8 percent in 2023; 6.5 percent in 2024
WASH spending share of GDP	0.56 percent of GDP in 2019; 0.1 percent in 2022
Population below poverty line	90 percent in 2025; 33 percent pre-conflict
Palestine refugees living below poverty line	89 percent (2025)
WFP Minimum Expenditure Basket (family of 5)	USD 200/month per family of 5 in October 2024
Average monthly salary (employee)	USD 30 to 70/month (2024-25)
Damage & Reconstruction	
Total physical damage to gross capital stock	USD 108bn between 2011–2024 (as of 31 Dec 2024)

Damage – Infrastructure	USD 52bn (48 percent of total damage) between 2011–2024 (as of 31 Dec 2024)
Damage – Residential buildings	USD 33bn (30 percent of total damage) between 2011–2024 (as of 31 Dec 2024)
Damage – Non-residential buildings	USD 23bn (22 percent of total damage) between 2011–2024 (as of 31 Dec 2024)
Hardest-hit governorate damage – Aleppo	USD 31bn between 2011–2024 (as of 31 Dec 2024)
Hardest-hit governorate damage – Rif Dimashq	USD 22bn between 2011–2024 (as of 31 Dec 2024)
Hardest-hit governorate damage – Homs	USD 11bn between 2011–2024 (as of 31 Dec 2024)
Reconstruction costs (conservative central estimate)	USD 216bn - 2025 estimate
Reconstruction costs (low–high range)	USD 140-345bn - 2025 estimate
Reconstruction – Infrastructure	USD 82bn - 2025 estimate
Reconstruction – Residential buildings	USD 70-80bn - 2025 estimates
Reconstruction – Non-residential buildings	USD 59bn - 2025 estimate
Food Security	
People food insecure	13.3 m people (2026)
People acutely food insecure	7.2 m people (2026)
People prioritized food security interventions	4 m people (2026)
Households relying on preferred food choices	~90 percent (2025)
Female-headed households reporting members going to bed hungry	19 percent (2025)
Female-headed households purchasing less costly food	93 percent (2025)
Female-headed households reducing meal sizes weekly	63 percent (2025)
Households using extreme negative coping strategies	from 59 percent to 76 percent (2021–2022)
Palestine refugees households using emergency coping strategies	40 percent (2025)
Palestine refugees households borrowing food or relying on others	92 percent (2025)
Palestine refugees households reducing daily meals	64 percent (2025)
Wheat output	0.9-1.1m tons (2024-2025)
Cost of a healthy diet (PPP)	USD 2.5/person/day in 2017; 5.7 in 2024
Nutrition	
Children under five stunted	25 percent - one in four stunted (2025)
Children in child food poverty	almost two million (2025)
Women & adolescent girls with anemia	31 percent (2025)
Children are more likely to be stunted (relative increase)	34 percent (2025)
Children are more likely to experience acute respiratory infections (relative increase)	53 percent (2025)
Water and sanitation	
Renewable water resources per capita	675 m3 per capita annually (recent)
Cost to restore pre-crisis WASH services	USD 10bn over 8–10 years
Annual cost to sustain WASH services	USD 1bn/year
IWRM implementation score (SDG 6.5.1)	63 (Index 0–100)

Urban & Shelter/Housing	
Population living in urban areas	over 70 percent (recent)
Property registered in women's names	7-10 percent (recent)
Housing stock damaged or destroyed during conflict	31 percent (during conflict)
Dwellings destroyed or severely damaged during conflict	328,000 dwellings (during conflict)
Annual housing output required (projection)	180,000 (2/3 urban) - projection
Projected housing output requirement vs 2010 output	148 to 222 percent of 2010 output - projection
People needing shelter assistance	6.8m (2025)
Population living in urban areas	55 percent pre crisis; 70 percent in 2025
Urban population in informal settlements	40 percent of urban population (recent)
Health	
People in need of health assistance	14.9 million (2024-25)
Doctor to population ratio	ratio 1:700 in 2010; <1:2000 in 2025
Hospitals fully functional	57 percent (2025)
Primary healthcare centres fully functional	1,236 out of 1,773 or 37 percent (2025)
Facilities offering obstetric and newborn care	78 percent (2025)
Maternal mortality ratio	107 deaths per 100,000 live births in 1994; 22 in 2004; 24 in 2013; 24 in 2019; 20 in 2023
Infant mortality rate	34.6 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1994; 17.1 in 2004; 19-26 in 2013-2022
Education	
Early childhood education participation	12 percent in 2010; 8 percent in 2017
Children entirely out of school	2.4m in 2024
Schools non-operational	40 percent (2024)
Education budget share	7.1 percent of national budget in 2011; 5.8 percent in 2019; 3.8 percent in 2023; 6.5 percent in 2024
Water and sanitation	
Renewable water resources per capita	675 m3 per capita annually (recent)
Cost to restore pre-crisis WASH services	USD 10bn over 8–10 years
Annual cost to sustain WASH services	USD 1bn/year
IWRM implementation score (SDG 6.5.1)	63 (Index 0–100 - recent)
People in need of WASH assistance	13.5m (2025)
Population relying on unsafe water	47 percent (2020)
Sewerage systems non-functional	50 percent (2025)
Untreated sewage discharge	70 percent (2025)
Energy	
Electricity generation capacity reduction	66 percent since pre-crisis
Earthquake damage to power sector	USD 34.8m (2023)
Environment & Climate	
Areas experiencing groundwater depletion increase	360 percent increase since 2004
Territory experiencing groundwater depletion	85 percent of country (2024)
Protection	

Estimated forcibly disappeared / detained / missing persons	100,000 (recent)
Operational civil registries	360 (pre Dec 2024); 80 in 2025
Grave violations against children	1,301 cases (2024)
Children killed or maimed	672 children (2024)
Children recruited or used by armed actors	527 children (2024)
Attacks on schools and hospitals	70 incidents (2024)
Children abducted	14 children (2024)
Children detained for alleged association with armed groups	1,000 children (2025)
Children with suspected family ties to Da'esh in Al-Hol and Roj	25,500 children (2025)
People in need of GBV assistance	8.5m (2025)

Annex C: Risk Analysis and Foresight

Multidimensional SDG Risk Analysis

Syria faces several interconnected risks spanning political, economic, social, and environmental dimensions that could affect development progress. Political uncertainties can impact economic stability, investor confidence, and social cohesion. Economic challenges including inflation, unemployment, and limited fiscal space can constrain service delivery and social protection. Social tensions rooted in years of conflict and displacement require attention to prevent escalation and support reconciliation. Environmental risks including climate change impacts on water resources and agricultural productivity add another dimension to the risk landscape.

Risk mitigation requires a partnership-oriented approach with government and UN working together to anticipate, monitor, and respond to emerging challenges. Strengthening governance structures can address political risks through more effective, transparent, and accountable institutions. Promoting economic reforms and diversification can build resilience to economic shocks. Enhancing social services and protection mechanisms can reduce social vulnerabilities. Investing in environmental sustainability and climate adaptation can address environmental risks. Throughout, inclusive approaches that build trust and social cohesion contribute to overall risk mitigation.

Detailed risk matrices and scenario analyses are provided in Annex B, offering comprehensive assessment of specific risks, their likelihood and potential impact, and corresponding mitigation measures. The risk analysis informs programming approaches that are adaptive, context-sensitive, and designed to build resilience even in uncertain environments. By addressing risks collaboratively and proactively, Syria can ensure sustainable progress toward development goals despite challenges that may emerge.

Risk Areas	Risk Factors	Likelihood	Impact
1. Political Stability *Description: Continued political fragmentation and a lack of progress towards an inclusive political resolution to the conflict, contributing to further instability and threats to peace.* *SDGs impacted: Particularly 5, 16, 17*	• Power consolidation, limited inclusion of different sects and communities across Syria, as well as women and youth in governance and decision-making processes. • De facto no alignment with international obligations, including pertaining to HR, civil and political rights. • External regional actors exacerbate internal political tensions and support various armed factions to advance geostrategic interests. • Weak social cohesion and community mistrust in institutions • Civil unrest and clashes lead to violence, internal displacement, and humanitarian challenges, further impacted by regional issues. • No explicit right to access information	●	●
2. Democratic and Civic Space *Description: Risk of inadequate or unstable representation during the transitional phase. Risk of failing to meet transitional commitments to develop permanent constitution and hold new elections. Risk of exclusion of key sectors of society (especially women) and communities. SDGs impacted: Particularly 5, 10, 16, 17*	• Threats of Human Rights violations and surveillance against civic actors and journalists. • Erosion of public trust and fear of reprisals reducing citizen engagement. • Limited investment in developing strong, accountable, and transparent transitional institutions. • Inadequate measures to ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory, and representative decision-making at all levels, especially women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life. • Restrictions on civil and political rights, especially the freedoms of assembly and association, including legislation on civil society and political parties. • Increased social fragmentation due to the spread of hatred speeches and military operations in some areas.	●	●
3. Internal Security *Description:* Increase in violent conflict and insecurity, as well as widespread contamination with explosive remnants of war, resulting in civilian injuries and deaths, displacement, and increased humanitarian needs. *SDGs impacted: All*	• Continued fragmentation of the country and a lack of progress towards a political resolution among all factions. • Violence in key areas between fractions, law enforcement and non-state armed groups and often with sectarian undertones. • Continued activity and sporadic attacks by Islamic State remnants in certain regions. • Incomplete steps toward a unified army. • Weak social cohesion and persistent inequalities. • Increase in crime-related security incidents resulting from the deteriorating economic and humanitarian situation. • Widespread presence of explosive hazards, including landmines and unexploded ordnance. • Inequitable and contested access to natural resources, including water and fuel, resulting in competition over natural resources. • Housing, land and property (HLP) disputes.	●	●
4. Justice and Rule of Law *Description: Weak rule of law and administration of justice in accordance with international norms and standards, resulting in human rights violations and a lack of accountability.* *SDGs impacted: Particularly 16, 17*	• Slow progress in transitional justice efforts to address accountability of all parties to the conflict (including not limited to the crimes of the previous regime) • Fragmented or parallel justice systems. • During the transitional phase, judicial independence remains weak, with various changes and vacancies impeding meaningful progress toward accountability and justice. • Greater affordability of legal rights to men over women, particularly in matters related to marriage, divorce, custody and guardianship, and inheritance. • Weak institutional capacity and outdated legal frameworks. • Persistent limited impunity for various crimes and violence, including ongoing gender-based violence against women and girls, with limited accountability. • Limitations on ability to assess protection risks, conduct protection interventions and monitoring, and engage government in dialogue on protection issues.	●	●

Risk Areas	Risk Factors	Likelihood	Impact
5. Economic and Financial Fragility *Description:* *Risk of worsening economic fragility and financial instability caused by inflation, sanctions-related restrictions, and declining productivity, leading to erosion of livelihoods and increased poverty* . *SDGs impacted:* *Particularly 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 16, 17*	• Despite the lifting and relief of some sanctions, some restrictions and their impacts continue to affect the situation. • Lack of improvement in transparency in the handling of the economy is possibly leading to mismanagement and corruption. • Lack of adequate financial sector reform. • Despite the significant lifting and relief of all sectoral and US primary sanctions, some restrictions and the long-standing de-risking posture of the private sector continue to affect the situation. • US export controls create roadblocks for the supply of critical infrastructure and energy projects. • Fuel and energy crisis reduce agricultural production capacity and increased costs. • High levels of inflation and currency depreciation lead to further erosion of purchasing power. • Vulnerability of productive sectors to shocks, particularly climate change and external geopolitical factors, etc. • Reduced access to essential services and the ability to rehabilitate infrastructure. • Weak private sector, high level of public sector employment, and declining national financial resources. • limited international assistance and lack of longer-term development support. • Further decline in human capital through emigration and lack of educational opportunities. • Systemic corruption and weak fiscal governance • Limited coordination between the Government and international organizations on implementation.	●	●
6. Regional and Global Influences *Description:* Risk of *global and regional factors threaten domestic politics, security, economic, and social stability.* *SDGs impacted:* *Particularly 1, 2, 8, 10, 16, 17*	• External regional actors exacerbate internal political tensions and support various armed factions to advance geostrategic interests. • Ongoing active and residual regional conflicts. • Cross-border security incidents impact civilians and infrastructure. • Politicization of humanitarian aid. • Reduced funding climate is increasing the risk of compromised humanitarian aid delivery and limited access to vulnerable populations	●	●
7. Environment and climate change *Description:* *Risk of increased climate-induced disasters and environmental degradation due to weak resource management, poor waste systems, and recurrent droughts, leading to livelihood losses, displacement, and heightened vulnerability* *SDGs impacted:* *Particularly 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17*	• Increased frequency and severity of extreme climactic events, including recurring drought-like conditions. • Land degradation and salinization, excessive logging, and forest fires. • Damage and destruction of terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems, including deforestation. • Weak community resilience to shocks and lack of scalable and shock-responsive social safety nets. • Reliance on vulnerable productive sectors, including agriculture and pastoralism. • Natural hazards and disasters and other drivers of humanitarian emergencies. • Weak national and local-level disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation strategies and coordination structures, early warning systems, disaster prevention, preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery strategies, capacities (including in disaster-related data), and resources. • Lack of holistic natural resource management strategies/plans. • Reconstruction is needed for water, sanitation, and waste and medical waste management, including for the safe disposal of hazardous and explosive materials and debris. • Insufficient coordination across agriculture, water, environment, climate, and meteorology services for coherent and informed policymaking.	●	●

Strategic Scenario Analysis for Syria 2027-2030

This annex presents a strategic scenario analysis for Syria's development trajectory through 2030. The analysis integrates all issues identified in this Common Country Analysis, links them to possible opportunities, and provides quantified targets. Two scenario narratives were developed based on varying assumptions about political stabilization, international engagement, and recovery financing.

C.1 METHODOLOGY AND FRAMEWORK

The scenario analysis employs a structured foresight methodology integrating quantitative projections with qualitative pathway analysis. Each scenario is built upon explicit assumptions regarding political trajectory, economic recovery, social development outcomes, displacement dynamics, and environmental resilience. Baseline indicators from 2025 are projected to 2030 under each scenario, using data evidence from the HNRP 2026[12], World Bank economic assessments, UNHCR displacement data, and IPCC climate projections. The analysis is forward-looking, providing structured scenario planning and exploring alternative development pathways with explicit implications for trade-offs. Risk interdependencies identified in Annex B are qualitatively incorporated into each scenario trajectory.

Key Baseline Indicators (2025): Based on the CCA analysis, an estimated 16.7 million people are in need, according to the HNRP 2026 analysis. Poverty remains pervasive, with 90 percent of the population living below the poverty line [24].

Displacement continues at scale, with 6.2 million IDPs side Syria and 5.5 million refugees in neighboring countries[25]. Food insecurity affects 13.1 million people, including 4 million severely food insecure. Approximately 2.4 million children are out of school. Health systems are under severe strain, with only 57 percent of hospitals fully operational[26]. SDG data availability stands at 31 percent of indicators.

The below two scenarios are estimates using these baseline indicators. The possible forward-looking outcomes below are pure expert's estimations.

Indicator	2025 Baseline	Accelerated Scenario 2030	Gradual Scenario 2030
Poverty Rate	90 percent	55-60 percent	70-75 percent
Food Insecure (in Millions)	13.3	5-6	8-9
IDPs (in Millions)	6.2	2-3	4.5-5
Diaspora Returns (in Millions)	-	2+	0.5
Hospital Functionality	57 percent	80 percent	65 percent
Out-of-School (in Millions)	2.4	<0.8	1.4-1.6
Reconstruction ($Billions)	-	50+	10-15
WASH Needs Met	0 percent	~70 percent	30-35 percent

Data Sources: HNRP 2026, World Bank, UNHCR, WHO HeRAMS, UNICEF, WFP

[24] https://humanitarianaction.info/plan/1518
[25] https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria
[26] https://humanitarianaction.info/plan/1276/document/syrian-arab-republic-humanitarian-response-priorities-january-december-2025/article/1-humanitarian-needs-1#:~:text=The percent20data percent20was percent20collected percent20after percent208 percent20December,gaps percent2C percent20and percent20strengthen percent20humanitarian percent20interventions percent20across percent20Syria.

C.2 SCENARIO 1: ACCELERATED RECOVERY

C.2.1 Scenario Narrative

Under the Accelerated Recovery scenario, Syria achieves rapid political stabilization with inclusive governance structures established by mid-2027. Comprehensive sanctions relief enables full international economic engagement, mobilizing over $50 billion in reconstruction funding through a coordinated donor framework. The diaspora returns accelerate, with over 2 million Syrians returning from abroad by 2030, bringing critical skills, investment capital, and international networks. Regional economic integration is restored, with trade corridors through Türkiye, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq fully operational. In this scenario the poverty rate declines significantly from 90 percent to approximately 55-60 percent as formal employment expands and social protection systems are rebuilt. Food security improves substantially, with the number of food-insecure people declining from 13.2 million to approximately 5-6 million by 2030. Health system recovery accelerates with hospital functionality rising from 57 percent to 80 percent by 2030. Education enrollment gaps close progressively, with the number of out-of-school children declining from 2.4 million to under 800,000. The displacement crisis sees major resolution, with IDP numbers declining from 6.2 million to approximately 2-3 million as durable solutions including return, local integration, and resettlement are implemented at scale.

Climate adaptation investments under this scenario include major WASH infrastructure rehabilitation addressing the projected 10-20 percent precipitation decline, climate-smart agriculture scaling, and renewable energy deployment supporting industrial recovery. The $10 billion WASH restoration requirement over 8-10 years is substantially funded, with approximately 70 percent of needs addressed by 2030.

C.3 SCENARIO 2: GRADUAL STABILIZATION

C.3.1 Scenario Narrative

The Gradual Stabilization scenario represents the most likely trajectory, characterized by incremental political progress with some fragmentation persisting. De facto partial sanctions relief enables expanded but constrained international engagement, with moderate reconstruction funding of $10-15 billion mobilized through bilateral and multilateral channels. Diaspora return is steady but slow, with approximately 500,000 returns by 2030, limited by continued uncertainty and unresolved HLP issues. Regional relations are mixed, with some trade normalization but continued tensions affecting full economic integration. Under this scenario, the poverty rate declines modestly from 90 percent to approximately 70-75 percent as some economic opportunities emerge, but structural constraints persist. Food security improves incrementally, with the food-insecure population declining from 13.2 million to approximately 8-9 million by 2030.

Health system recovery proceeds at a measured pace, with hospital functionality rising from 57 percent to approximately 65 percent by 2030. Progress is constrained by continued health worker emigration and limited infrastructure investment. Education enrollment gaps close partially, with out-of-school children declining from 2.4 million to approximately 1.4-1.6 million. The displacement crisis sees gradual improvement, with IDP numbers declining from 6.2 million to approximately 5 million as localized durable solutions are implemented where conditions permit. Climate adaptation under this scenario is ad-hoc and insufficiently funded. The WASH infrastructure gap narrows slightly, with approximately 30-35 percent of the $10 billion restoration need addressed by 2030. Syria remains highly vulnerable to climate shocks, with limited capacity to manage projected temperature and precipitation changes.

C.5 STRATEGIC LINKAGES: ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES

This section synthesizes how the issues and opportunities identified across this CCA interact strategically under each scenario. The analysis reveals that the opportunity is not static but expands or contracts based on scenario trajectory, while issues can either be addressed through opportunity realization or can be compounded depending on the development pathway.

C.5.1 Governance Issues and Opportunities

The CCA identifies critical governance issues including fragmented institutions, limited citizen trust, weak rule of law with 50 percent of justice infrastructure destroyed, large-scale brain drains of civil servants, and limited participation of women and youth in decision-making. Opportunities include the national dialogue process, indirect elections, Syria's international reintegration, and nationally led recovery planning.

Under the Accelerated Recovery scenario, these opportunities create positive feedback loops where international reintegration enables technical assistance and capacity building, which strengthens institutions, which builds citizen trust, which enables deeper reforms. The national recovery framework provides a roadmap, and Arab League engagement mobilizes regional support. Under the Gradual Stabilization scenario, opportunities are partially realized. International engagement enables some capacity building, but fragmentation persists in some areas. Trust building is incremental, and reforms are uneven across the country.

C.5.2 Economic Issues and Opportunities

Economic issues include 85 percent GDP contraction, 90 percent poverty rate, 99 percent currency depreciation, $216-400 billion reconstruction needs, inflation exceeding 100 percent, food prices 100 times pre-conflict levels, weak private sector, limited finance access, and informal economy dominance. Opportunities include mild GDP recovery in 2025, sanctions relief opening financial connectivity, 5.5 million diaspora representing investment potential, ILO convention ratification as foundation for labor standards, private sector as recovery driver, and regional trade corridor potential.

Under the Accelerated Recovery scenario, sanctions relief unlock financial sector reform, which enables diaspora investment mobilization through bonds and remittance facilitation, which creates employment, which reduces poverty, which stimulates demand, which attracts further investment. The $50 billion in mobilized reconstruction funding addresses the reconstruction gap.

Under the Gradual Stabilization scenario, partial sanctions relief enables some financial reform but is insufficient to fully unlock diaspora potential. Private sector recovery is constrained by remaining restrictions and uncertain investment environment. Poverty declines modestly but structural constraints persist.

C.5.3 Social Issues and Opportunities

Social issues include 16.7 million people in need, 13.2 million food insecure, 2.4 million children out of school, one in three schools damaged, 57 percent hospitals are functional, 70 percent health workers fled, 22.4 percent female-headed households, 12 percent women's labor force participation, and 31 percent housing stock destroyed. Opportunities include projected mortality rate improvements, WFP reaching 5.5 million monthly, UN support for voluntary returns, and non-formal education pathways.

Under the Accelerated Recovery scenario, massive investment in health, education, and social protection rebuilds human capital. School reconstruction and teacher training close education gaps. Health infrastructure investment enables health worker return. Social protection systems are being rebuilt.

Under the Gradual Stabilization scenario, incremental improvements occur in stable areas while gaps persist in fragmented zones. Non-formal education expands to reach some out-of-school children. Health services improve in some facilities.

C.5.4 Displacement Issues and Opportunities

Displacement issues include 5.5 million refugees, 6.2 million IDPs, camp populations in Al-Hol and Al-Roj, HLP disputes deterring returns, and missing documentation.

Opportunities include over 1 million refugee returns since December 2024, 1.9 million IDP returns, renewed hopes for stability, and diaspora knowledge transfer potential.

Under the Accelerated Recovery scenario, comprehensive durable solutions are implemented including voluntary return with HLP resolution, local integration, and resettlement. Diaspora return brings human capital and investment. Camp populations are resolved through repatriation and reintegration. Under the Gradual Stabilization scenario, localized durable solutions progress in stable areas while displacement persists in fragmented zones. Some returns continue but are constrained by HLP issues and service gaps.

C.5.5 Environmental Issues and Opportunities

Environmental issues include projected 1.5-2.0°C temperature increase, 10-20 percent precipitation decrease, increasing drought frequency, water stress among world's highest, 600 cubic meters per capita water availability, 30-40 percent loss of water sector technical staff, $10 billion WASH restoration needs, air pollution, groundwater depletion, and collapsed natural resource governance.

Opportunities include IWRM implementation at medium-high level, active role of the Ministry of Emergency and Disaster Management, renewable energy potential, and climate-resilient agriculture possibilities. Under the Accelerated Recovery scenario, major climate adaptation investments address WASH infrastructure, establish early warning systems, support climate-smart agriculture, and deploy renewable energy. The new ministry develops national strategies and frameworks. Under the Gradual Stabilization scenario, ad-hoc climate responses address some immediate needs but leave Syria vulnerable to climate shocks. Limited investment addresses priority areas only.

C.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE COOPERATION FRAMEWORK

This scenario analysis directly informs the design of the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (UNSDCF) 2027-2030 by identifying strategic priorities, programming approaches, and adaptive mechanisms across scenario trajectories.